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1. Introduction
The growth of government has become a global phenomenon
which, over the years, has attracted a great deal of atten-
tion and continues to do so . This growth has not been uni-
form, neither in time nor in space, and it was the factors
underlying these differences interest has focused on. No
comprehensive theory, however, has yet emerged from the pro-
lific and varied literature. Instead, a number of approaches
was developed, each of them an "incomplete explanation of a
complex phenomenon" .
A problem common to all of them when it comes to testing hy-
potheses empirically, is the measurement of total public
sector economic activity. For lack of data, it is usually
approximated by public expenditures. Most probably, this
understates the role of government in economic life, since
many of its activities, while unrecorded in the budget, re-
direct resources just as taxation and public spending do.
Typical examples are consumer and worker safety regulation,
public utility price and output regulation in certain indus-
tries, and tax expenditures .
With the expenditures of local government, this is much less
of a problem. They are predominantly providers of goods and
services and their expenditures can be expected to reflect
total economic activity, and hence their influence on re-
source allocation, fairly well. At the same time, the share
See for example the proceedings of the "Nobel symposium on
the Growth of Government: Stockholm 1984", reported in:
Journal of Public Economics, Volume 28, 1985, No. 3.
2 PREMCHAND (1983), p. 40.
For a recent treatment of identification and measurement
problems of government activity see HERBER (1984), p. 141.- 2 -
of local government in total public expenditures is conside-
rable. For many of the Western democracies, it has increased
absolutely and relatively over the years, such that in many
of them local government is now a major provider of goods
and services.
The determinants of local government expenditures have been
studied in great detail for the US, the UK and also Switzer-
land . In the Federal Republic of Germany, by contrast, de-
terminants of local government expenditure have received on-
ly scant attention and empirical research until today has
remained largely anecdotal. This seems surprising, given the
prominent role of local government in a federal system and
in the matters concerning its design. These include assign-
ment of functions and taxes as well as criteria for grant
distribution, for which identification of expenditure deter-
minants is a necessary prerequisite.
2
The results of a recent empirical study , the most important
of which will be presented in Section 3 of this paper, are
suited to at least partly fill this void. The results
strongly corroborate the validity of the underlying expend-
iture decision model and of the estimating equation used
here. In Section 2, the approach chosen for the empirical
study will be contrasted with other approaches to the deter-
mination of public expenditures so as to put it into per-
spective. In Section 4, conclusions and suggestions for fur-
ther research are presented.
For surveys see CUTHBERTSON (1981), HAUSER (1975), and IN-
MAN (1979).
2
Most of the results presented here are from a research
project on the determinants of expenditure of local, state
and federal government. It was financed by a grant from
"Stiftung Volkswagenwerk" and will be published in 1987.- 3 -
2. Theoretical Approaches to the Explanation of Public
Sector Size
A variety of approaches has been offered to explain differ-
ences in expenditures, both over time and between adminis-
trative units, such as constituent states or municipalities.
No attempt will be made here to review them, since this was
done elsewhere before . Instead, the approach on which the
empirical study was based, will be contrasted with the prin-
cipal alternatives.
Since the expenditures of local government are at issue, it
seems plausible to start from the following assumptions: The
role of the "state", i. e. in this case of local government,
is that of a provider of goods and services and it is the
citizenry which determines their scope and composition.
MUELLER has labelled this the "citizen over state" concep-
tualisation of the state where it is assumed that the state
exists to carry out the will of the people. Within the al-
ternative "state over citizen" view, the preferences of the
state, i. e. the individuals within the government and the
administration, are decisive . The main approaches based on
the second one are theories of bureaucracy, the PEACOCK-
WISEMAN displacement-concentration effect, BAUMOL's notion
of unbalanced growth of the public and the private sector
and, finally, the fiscal illusion hypothesis.
In the theories of bureaucracy, originally developed by NIS-
KANEN (1971) and BRETON (1974), expenditures are assumed to
be determined by the civil servants' desire to maximise the
budgets at their disposal. Checks and balances come into the
picture only via the legislature and via competition among
jurisdictions. Recent studies are from ROMER and ROSENTHAL
1 Examples are MUELLER (1986), BAHL et al. (1980) and INMAN
(1979).
2
The fundamental distinction between the two views can be
traced back to De Viti' de Marco's, and Mazzola's concepts
of the individualistic and the paternalistic state, PREM-
CHAND (1983), p. 41.- 4 -
(1978, 1979, 1980), and MCGUIRE (1981). NOLL and FIORINI
(1978) have studied the relationship between bureaucrats,
legislators and voters, and especially the situation in
which increasing numbers of civil servants are at the same
time voters or part of the legislature. An extensive survey
of studies using theories of bureaucracy was provided by
THUERMER (1984) .
The main drawback of the theories of bureaucracy, it has
been argued, is their failure to explain how bureaucrats ma-
nage to extract additional funds from the legislature. Po-
liticians do not per se have an interest in increased bud-
gets which is why in theories of bureaucracy one ultimately
has to rely on specific events that make augmentations of
the budget possible. This is where the PEACOCK/WISEMAN dis-
placement-concentration effect comes in as a possible expla-
nation.
They argue that the growth of government expenditures is
characterised by jumps rather than a continuous development
and that these jumps are associated with major upheavals in
society such as wars or economic depressions . Furthermore,
it is argued that in such a situation expenditures grow
primarily on the central government level. This is an idea
that, albeit in a different context, POPITZ has put forward
already in the 1920s.
The displacement-concentration effect is not without intui-
tive appeal and some empirical evidence has been brought
forward in its support. But there are also numerous cases in
which factual evidence simply flies in the face of expected
2
outcomes . Clearly, the major problem with this approach is
that it does not lend itself readily to systematic empirical
testing. Since it is mainly concerned with central govern-
1 See PEACOCK and WISEMAN (1961).
2
For a critical evaluation, especially of the concentration
effect, see PELTZMAN (1980) and DAVIES (1970).- 5 -
ment spending it can not be expected to be of much use for
the explanation of local government expenditures.
At least prima facie this is not the case with BAUMOL's the-
sis of unbalanced growth . He argues that the relative ex-
pansion of the public sector is due to systematic producti-
vity differentials between the public and the private sec-
tor. Allegedly, they result from labour intensive methods of
production .and the lack of opportunities to introduce tech-
nological change in the public sector. The major problem
here is to measure the productivity of government services
that are not produced by sale. Likewise, it can be doubted
whether labour intensive production and lack of technologi-
2
cal change are still characteristic for the public sector '.
One major approach remains to be mentioned. It is based on
the notion of fiscal illusion, i. e. the systematic misper-
ception by taxpayers/voters of the ratio of the taxes paid
to the benefits (goods and services) received . The fiscal
illusion approach parallels the theories of bureaucracy.
There it is the legislature which is deceived as to the true
costs of supplying different levels of output. Under the
fiscal illusion hypothesis, by contrast, it is argued that
the bureaucracy deceives the citizens as to the true size of
government. It does so by increasing the tax burden in a way
that leaves the citizens unaware of it. Tax burdens are thus
disguised and citizens have the illusion that government is
smaller than it actually is. Then government can grow beyond
the levels citizens would prefer.
The empirical literature on fiscal illusion has been re-
viewed by OATES (1985). The results are mixed which, accord-
ing to MUELLER (1986), is not surprising given the vagueness
BAUMOL (1967) .
2
See PEACOCK (1979), p. 110 - 116, for an application of
the BAUMOL-thesis to post-industrial societies.
The notion of fiscal illusion dates back to an early 20th
century Italian writer, PUVIANI.- 6 -
of a concept that at best seems suited to explain why fiscal
illusion could lead to larger budgets but not why it
should .
Outstanding examples of empirical studies whose results sup-
port the fiscal illusion hypothesis are POMMEREHNE and
SCHNEIDER (1978 and 1982). They found that municipalities
with an intricate system of local taxation and with a repre-
sentative local democracy had higher expenditures than those
with a simple system and direct democracy. Similar studies
were undertaken by ROMER and ROSENTHAL (1978, 1979, 1980).
In these studies the fiscal illusion hypothesis was, how-
ever, always embedded in an approach based on the notion of
the "citizen over state". The fiscal illusion hypothesis was
then used as an additional explanation which also served to
link the demand side of publicly provided goods with the
supply side.
The overwhelming majority of empirical studies undertaken
until today are, however, predominantly based on the notion
of the "citizen-over-state". Here, two main approaches can
be distinguished. Firstly, the public goods approach which
is essentially an analysis of the demand for publicly pro-
vided goods and services very much along the lines of tradi-
tional consumer choice theory. The second approach concen-
trates on the redistributive function of the state which
during the last decades has become an increasingly important
part of government activities.
Already back in 1835 de TOCQUEVILLE suggested that demand
for redistribution was positively related to the extension
of suffrage and the degree of inequality in the distribution
2
of property . Recent empirical research, by using the con-
See MUELLER (1986), p. 30; for a critique, see also PEA-
COCK (1979), p. 115, and MUSGRAVE (1981), p. 98 - 104.
2
de TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, quoted in: Peacock
(1979), p. 107.- 7 -
cept of the median voter and his demand for redistribution,
has proceeded along similar lines .
These studies have been criticized for assuming that redist-
ribution is the only function of government and that all re-
distribution is from rich to poor. More generally, the ap-
proach fails to explain why - under majority voting - suf-
2 frage would be extended in the first place .
These difficulties nonwithstanding, the demand for redistri-
bution ought to be taken into account when total public ex-
penditures are at issue. However, as far as local government
is concerned it seems justified to neglect this aspect and
to concentrate on the citizens' demand for goods and ser-
vices. This particular approach to the determinants of ex-
penditure has proved a fertile ground for empirical testing.
By now, it has generated a large and varied body of litera-
ture labelled expenditure determinants studies. Early be-
ginnings date back to the end of the 19th century. WAGNER
was the first scholar to recognize a positive correlation
between the level of economic development and the size of
the public sector .
Since then, a variety of empirical studies has sought to
test the validity of "WAGNER's Law of the Expanding State
Expenditures". These were either time series studies of the
growth of expenditures in individual countries or cross sec-
tion comparisons of expenditure patterns across a number of
Examples are PELTZMAN (1980), MELTZER and RICHARD (1978,
1981, 1983), ARANSON and ORDESHOOK (1981) and BRUNNER
(1978) .
2 See MUELLER (1986), p. 145.
3 WAGNER (1883 and 1893) quoted in Tarschys (1975), p. 10.
TARSCHYS also points out that before this theory of grow-
ing government activities became commonly accepted, an op-
posite hypothesis held sway for several hundred years.
This was the belief, dating back to the age of Enlighten-
ment, that the scope of government actions would diminish
with the moral and economic evolution of mankind.- 8 -
countries. A commonly used measure for government growth has
been the elasticity of the ratio of government expenditures
to GDP with respect to GDP per capita . Not surprisingly,
the results for different countries lacked universality and
WAGNER's basic presumption was later split into several hy-
potheses. MUSGRAVE (1970), for example, proposed to differ-
entiate expenditures by category, such as capital formation,
consumption and transfer payments. HELLER and TAIT (1983),
in a cross section analysis including developed and develop^
ing countries, tested WAGNER's Law for government expenditu-
res on personnel. It was confirmed in the majority of cases.
More recently ABIZADEH and GRAY (1985) tested WAGNER's Law
against pooled time-series, cross section data for 53 count-
ries and found systematic differences between developing and
developed countries.
WAGNER had only touched upon the possible influence of popu-
lation density on expenditures, a factor that BRECHT invest-
igated more closely. He propounded the "law of the progres-
sive influence of massed conglomeration" and found empirical
evidence for the expenditures on specific functions such as
2
housing, welfare and internal security .
Thus far, only the influence on expenditures of a single
factor had been investigated. FABRICANT (1952) was the first
to estimate simultaneously the influence of a number of in-
dependent variables (per capita income, population density,
and urbanization) on the expenditures of state and local
governments. He is commonly regarded as the initiator of the
determinants approach and, following his lines, a great deal
of other studies were undertaken, mainly for the US but also
for the UK and Switzerland .
For a survey of the empirical literature see BIRD (1970),
p. 69-88 and AFXENTION (1980) .
2 BRECHT (1932), Internationaler Vergleich der oeffentlichen
Ausgaben, quoted in: Tarschys (1975), p. 11; see also
KAEHLER (1982) for a comparison of Brecht's with Wagner's
Law.
For a survey of early determinants literature see, for
example, BAHL (1968), HAUSER (1975), and CUTHBERTSON
(1981) .- 9 -
It is the merit of these early studies to have provided
first approximations of the variables relevant for public
expenditures. At the same time they served to carve out the
main areas of contention such as the influence of grants,
population density, and economies of scale on expenditures.
The main drawback of the early studies was their lack of a
firm foundation in theory. Since independent variables were
chosen more or less ad-hoc not much could be inferred with
regard to the structural relations among them. As a result
it was frequently impossible to interpret coefficients in a
meaningful way and to relate the results of one study to
those of others. INMAN concluded that the early determinants
studies were "more suggestive of problems to be avoided than
of answers to be used" .
The first to develop a firm conceptual framework upon which
to build and interpret empirical analyses were GRAMLICH
(1968), HENDERSON (1968), and BARR and DAVIS (1966). Their
studies became the basis for most of the empirical work that
2
followed. The "fundamental innovation" of these studies is
to apply traditional consumer choice theory to the public
sector. Consequently, it is asserted that fiscal decisions
can be viewed as made in a fashion that maximises some uti-
lity function subject to a set of constraints. Briefly, a
utility function is assumed to represent individual prefer-
ences for local service outputs and private net of tax in-
come. The individual budget constraint with local services
and financing is then derived under the assumption that to-
tal taxes as well as service outputs are shared on a per ca-
pita basis. The link with the community budget constraint is
provided by a cost function where factor prices of labour
and material are exogenous and related to a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale. Maxi-
mising the utility function which is interpreted as the pro-
1 INMAN (1979), p. 274.
2 INMAN (1979), p. 274.- 10 -
cess of fiscal choice then yields a set of demand equations
which can be tested empirically .
There are two important advantages over the early determi-
nants studies. Firstly, a structural model allows for detai-
led hypotheses to be tested regarding the influence of the
underlying structural relations. Secondly, parameters esti-
mated for the independent variables of the reduced-form
equations can be interpreted unequivocably.
As regards the specification of the community utility func-
tion, i. e. the decision as to whose preferences govern lo-
cal fiscal choice, there are several possibilities. One of
them, which is explicitely related to the demand for public-
ly provided goods and services, is the median voter model of
fiscal choice.
Generally speaking, the median voter theorem is based on the
notion that individual voters determine the political deci-
sions within a democracy. Politicians, in making tax and ex-
penditure decisions, reflect the preferences of their con-
2
stituents. Under certain conditions the voter with median
characteristics such as income, housing value, tax bill, and
tastes is pivotal for ballot outcomes. In a framework of lo-
cal fiscal choice he thus determines the demand for public-
ly provided goods and services. BAHL et al. have pointed out
that in this respect the median voter approach parallels the
4
public choice approach to government expenditures .
A blueprint of constrained maximization applied to local
fiscal choice is in INMAN (1979), p. 275 - 278.
2
For a concise description and critical analysis see INMAN
(1978), p. 278 - 283, ROMER and ROSENTHAL (1979), p. 145 -
146, AKIN and LEA (1982), p. 114 - 117.
The median voter theorem has been employed in a wide range
of economic contexts, including pollution control, income
redistribution and minimum wage legislation. See ROMER and
ROSENTHAL (1979), p. 144.
4 BAHL et al. (1980), p. 70.- 11 -
At the same time it can be considered part of the con-
strained maximization framework outlined above, in that the
median voter's utility function becomes the community utili-
ty function. Clearly, the great advantage of the median
voter approach is that, while applying the principle of con-
sumer sovereignty to political decisions, it allows for the
analysis of social problems via the preferences of a single
individual.
The median voter approach to local fiscal choice is not
without drawbacks . Firstly, the conditions under which it
may appropriately be applied are restrictive and rarely are
2
all of them fulfilled . But even if the median voter can be
assumed to be representative, additional assumptions have to
be made. They regard prices of goods other than publicly
provided, the specification of the budget constraint as well
as of the production function, and the use of per capita ex-
penditures as a proxy for output . Finally, econometric
problems of multicollinearity and simultaneity may arise
when the reduced form equations are tested empirically.
The ensuing caveats nonwithstanding, empirical studies using
this approach have yielded meaningful and suggestive results
that, by and large, have tended to square with economic
4
theory . The median voter specification of the constrained
maximization approach to local fiscal choice can therefore
be considered an appropriate way to identify the determi-
For a fundamental criticism see GROSSKOPF and HAYES
(1983).
2
The most important ones are: Low barriers for running for
political office, well informed voters, no abstentions,
voting by majority rule and on one-dimension-issues, medi-
an voter is the one with median family income. On the me-
dian voter model and public expenditures see also ATKINSON
and STIGLITZ (1980), p. 322 - 330. On research into the
appropriateness of applying the median voter model see
BAHL et al. (1980), p. 74.
This is discussed in detail by BAHL et al. (1980), p. 76 -
87.
4
See for example the survey of BAHL et al. (1980), p. 89 -
99.- 12 -
nants of local government expenditures. It is to its appli-
cation to the expenditures of West German local government
that I turn in the next section.
3. The Median Voter Approach Tested for Local Government in
the Federal Republic of Germany
Within the overall federal structure of West Germany, local
government is a major provider of goods and services and its
share of aggregate public expenditure is considerable. More-
over, by international standards, it is comparatively inde-
pendent. One reason for this is the principle of "communal
self-administration" which is recognized in the constitution
and is held to imply a high degree of local autonomy. Speci-
fically, this entails the competence for any municipality to
provide any services considered to be in the interest of the
inhabitants. Even though in practice "communal self-adminis-
tration" will often be constrained by various statutory pro-
visions, discretion over expenditure decisions remains com-
paratively high. It would therefore seem that, whatever the
determinants of local government expenditure are likely to
be, their influence on overall public spending can be expec-
ted to be substantial.
It is all the more surprising that empirical research until
today has remained sparse and that practically nothing could
be said about West German local government as a whole. Only
three recent studies exist that employ testable expenditure
equations. PROSS (1982) is the only one explicitly deriving
his reduced-form equation from the median voter model. But
only the 144 smallest municipalities of a single state, Ba-
den-Wuerttemberg, were studied and only 1976/77 aggregate
expenditures were analysed. In the two other studies by DEU-
BEL (1984) and MIELKE (1985) expenditures are differentiated
by function but the approaches chosen are merely statistical
and in no way related to an underlying model of expenditure
decision. Furthermore, they are equally confined to the mun-
icipalities of one state, Northrhine-Westphalia.aes institiits
fiir Weltwirtschaft Kiel
- 13 -
For the present study, the 500 largest municipalities in
West Germany were selected for a cross section analysis.
They account for roughly half of the country's population
and half the aggregate expenditure of local government. Ag-
gregate expenditures as well as a breakdown by functions
were analysed for each of the fiscal years 1980 - 1983. It
can thus be considered the first expenditure determinant
study fairly representative of West German local government.
The estimating equation used here is of the log-linear type
and is based on the one presented by BORCHERDING and DEACON
(1972). They were among the first to
1 develop a model of
public spending which was derived from the received theory
of collective decision making - in this case the median vo-
ter theorem - and to test the significance of certain vari-
ables assumed by the theory to be relevant for local govern-
ment spending .
Their estimating equation was modified to account for some
particular features of German local government. In addition,
the influence on expenditures of grant and population change
was tested. In log-linear form, such that coefficients can
be interpreted as elasticities, the equation is
In (E/N)± = bQ + bx In N + b2 In (Y/N) + b3 In P^^ + b4 In
(N/A) + bc In (G/N) . + bc Dl + b_ D2 + bo D3 bib / o
where (E/N). = per capita expenditures on function i
Y/N = per capita income
P. = price of goods publicly provided
N/A = population density (A stands for
administrative area)
(G/N). = specific grant per capita
Dl = dummy for "growing/declining popula-
tion"
See Table 3 for these functions
2 BORCHERDING and DEACON, 1972, p. 891-901- 14 -
D2 = dummy for "direct/representative local
democracy"
D3 = dummy for "type of administrative sta-
tus"
Per capita income for each local authority was derived from
income tax statistics data and, in accordance with the pro-
positions of traditional consumer choice theory, they as
well as population were expected to be positively related to
per capita expenditures.
While it was assumed that for privately provided goods and
services price differences are zero, a price variable was
derived for the goods and services provided by the munici-
palities . Using a Cobb-Douglas function and assuming per-
fect mobility of capital and therefore identical rates of
interest among the local authorities, the price of good i in
local authority j can be written as
where w is the wage rate and fi the partial elasticity of
production with respect to labour. Wage rates were approxi-
mated by the ratio of payroll to the number of employees.
The partial elasticity of production with respect to labour
was approximated by the ratio of payroll to total expendi-
ture. Accordingly, prices were estimated for each of the
local authorities under consideration, as well as each
function and year. In other words, for each of the local
authorities and each of the functions a separate production
function was assumed to exist. Price differentials between
local authorities could then be interpreted either as the
result of differences in the efficiency of the production
technique employed or in the average wage rates. Per capita
expenditures and prices were expected to be negatively re-
lated.
1 BORCHERDING and DEACON, 1972, p. 893- 15 -
Density of population and per capita expenditures were ex-
pected to be positively related whenever higher density nec-
cessitated additional public provision of goods and services
or, rendered provision of already existing ones more costly.
The latter is likely to be the case for the expenditure on
most functions. A negative influence of population density
was expected in cases where the good or service in question
displayed the characteristics of a public good or provision
could be associated with increasing scale economies.
Per capita grants were expected to be positively related to
per capita expenditures. Only specific grants were included
into the estimation and, due to the criteria employed for
their distribution, they are practically all closed-ended in
nature. Their effect on expenditure was therefore expected
to be substituting rather than stimulating, with elastici-
ties smaller than one.
Expenditures per capita, especially for the operation of
public facilities, were also expected to be influenced by
population changes. Decreasing population will in most cases
lead to decreasing numbers of users of such facilities. Un-
less adjusted in size, production will then become ineffi-
cient and per capita expenditures are likely to rise. In
municipalities with a persistent population decline, per
capita expenditures can therefore be expected to lie signi-
ficantly above those of municipalities with a more or less
constant population. On the other hand, in local authorities
with a persistent population increase, political and admi-
nistrative lags may prevent demand for additional goods and
services from becoming immediately effective and may there-
fore lead to significantly lower per capita expenditures.
Such deviations were expected for "Education", "Science,
Arts and Libraries", "Personal Social Services", "Health and
Sports", "Housing" and "Public Enterprises". Persistent po-
pulation decline or increase was measured as the relative
change of population between mid-1978 and mid-1983. It was
introduced into the equation as a dummy variable (Dl), which
takes the value of one in the case of declining population
and zero in the case of constant or increasing population.- 16 -
The details of local administration, representation and
government differ considerably from one state to the other
and these differences are likely to affect local authori-
ties' expenditure decisions. Elements of direct democracy
prevail in the municipalities of Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg
and Rhineland-Palatinate, where the local mayor is either
elected directly by the population and not by the members of
the city council, or can be dismissed prematurely by general
referendum. In addition, under certain conditions, other
forms of referenda may be held. None of this is possible in
the local authorities of the other states where elements of
representative democracy prevail .
These different degrees of directness of democracy were
assumed to be sytematically related to different degrees of
2
fiscal burden and expenditure illusion . In local authori-
ties of the direct democracy type, voters are likely to be
better informed about decisions taken by local government
and will also to a greater extent influence these decisions.
In that case, fiscal illusion and, consequently, expenditu-
res are expected to be significantly lower than in local au-
thorities of the representative democracy type. This was
also tested with a dummy-variable (D2), which takes the va-
lue of one for representative democracy authorities and of
zero for direct democracy authorities.
The expected signs of all independent variables chosen for
the estimation are summarized in Table 1. OLS regressions
were run for aggregate expenditures as well as expenditures
on separate functions, for the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and
1983. Not all calculations are presented here, but only
those for capital and operating expenditures lumped together
and with the values of the independent variables of the same
year as those of the dependent variables. In other words, it
was assumed that in municipalities decisions on expenditures
are taken with regard to the current situation. Because of
1 LANG (1975) , p.. 154.
2 See POMMEREHNE and SCHNEIDER (1978), p. 325.- 17 -




per capita income (Y/N) ( + ) *
price of goods publicly provided (P.) (-)
population density (N/A) (+)**
per capita grant (G/N) (+)
declining population (Dl=l) (+)
representative local democracy (D2=l) (+)
"kreisfreie Stadt" (D3=l) (+)
* (-) for expenditures on "Personal Social Services"
** (-) for expenditures on "Refuse Collection and Disposal"
the long-term character of certain expenditure categories,
it would have been equally plausible to assume a lag between
variations of independent variables' values and expenditure
variations. Estimations with a one-year-lag, however, did
not add to the model's explanatory power.
Per capita spending was not split into capital and operating
expenditures even though spending on either category may be
influenced by different factors and lumpiness of capital
spending could make any one year's distribution non-repre-
sentative. In previous studies, capital spending was there-
fore sometimes excluded from the analysis. This, however, is
justified only if the ratio of capital to operating expendi-
tures is the same regardless of the scale of output of muni-
cipal services and, for a given amount of output, capital
and operating expenditures, are non-substitutable .
1 See WILENSKY (1970), p. 206.- 18 -
For the municipalities considered here, neither of these
assumptions seems particularly reasonable. Instead, separate
regressions were run for capital and operating expenditures.
For both categories, the variations in expenditure were
somewhat better explained for the functions "Law and Order",
"Education" and "Public Enterprises". For all others, the
results were either inferior to those presented in Tables 2
and 3 or remained virtually unchanged.
Results for total expenditures are reported in Table 2. With
values of adjusted R
2 of 0.71 to 0.75, the overall fit is
good and the F-values are sufficiently high to ensure over-
all statistical significance for all the years considered.
Moreover, the majority of coefficients for the independent
variables is significantly different from zero on the 1 per-
cent level (two-tailed t-test), all others on the 5 percent
level. With the exception of the variable D2 that accounts
for different degrees of direct democracy, the signs of all
coefficients conform to a priori expectations. All in all,
results for different years differ only marginally. Although
capital expenditures were not excluded, lumpiness for any
one year does not seem to have affected the results.
Regressions were also run for the expenditures by functions
and again, results for different years were very similar so
that only those for 1983 are reported (Table 3). With values
for adjusted R
2 ranging from 0.54 to 0.68 and for the F-test
from 71 to 128, the explanatory power of the estimating
equation is high for "General Administration", "Law, Order
and Protective Services", "Science, Arts and Libraries",
"Personal Social Services" and "Housing". For "Education",
"Health", "Refuse Collection" and "Public Enterprises" this
is, however, clearly not the case. Equally, considerable
differences exist between coefficients with regard to their
statistical significance and the values they take. Most of
the deviations from expected outcomes, however, can be ex-

































































































Y/N: per capita income
P: price of goods publicly provided
N/A: population density
G/N: per capita grant
Dl: dummy variable 'growing/declining population
1, Dl = 1: decline
D2: dummy variable 'type of local government constitution
1, D2 = 1: re-
presentative democracy
D3: dummy variable 'administrative status
1, D3 = 1: 'kreisfreie Stadt
1
Figures in parantheses indicate the t- and F-values. An asterisk indicates
statistical significance at the 95%, two asterisks at the 99% confidence






















































































































































































































For notes see Table 2.- 21 -
4. Conclusions
The consumer choice model of expenditure decision that was
used to explain variations in the spending of the 500 lar-
gest local authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany
proved to be of considerable explanatory power for four con-
secutive years. The most robust results were obtained for
aggregate expenditures, but also for expenditures broken
down by function the approach has yielded results that for
the majority of services are plausible and instructive. Ap-
parently, differences with regard to the conditions of pro-
duction, their characteristics in terms of the theory of
public goods and price as well as income elasticities do not
in principle alter the validity of the approach.
It seems therefore an appropriate basis for further research
into the expenditures of West German local government. This
should be directed to the testing of more detailed local
fiscal hypotheses. Publicness coefficients, the influence of
population density and of scale economies in the production
of publicly provided goods should be estimated for expendi-
tures on specific services. Information on what determines
the expenditures of local government under the present as-
signment of functions and revenues is indispensable for the
evaluation of attempts to reform local taxation, the distri-
bution of grant and the position of local government in the
framework of fiscal federalism.- 22 -
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